2.  The delegation found that visible progress had been made since the Committee's last visit in May of 2006.  For instance, Members remarked on the increased economic activity visible on the streets of Kabul.  Members were also encouraged by the good work they saw at the several Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) they visited.  Significantly, this included the PRT at Lashkar Gah in Helmand Province, largely considered one of Afghanistan's most dangerous and unstable areas, and by far the largest producer of poppy in Afghanistan.

3.  Members were especially encouraged by the excellent performance of the Alliance's personnel in Afghanistan, as well as that of our partners fighting alongside NATO troops.  Not only was Allied personnel doing good work, but it was doing so in a remarkably successful multi-national manner.  NATO member states were demonstrating interoperability and performing well.

4.  On the other hand, the delegation also came away with a strong concern regarding the critical tactical and strategic challenges hampering efforts to secure and stabilize Afghanistan.

5.  At the tactical level, it was clear that ISAF was more than capable of clearing any given area of insurgents.  However, ISAF did not have enough forces to 'backfill' and hold a cleared area after a successful operation.  Thus, as NATO forces left for their next operation, insurgents often returned to the area.  Local populations, fearing consequences on the return of insurgent forces, were thus unable to commit to supporting the efforts of ISAF and the Government of Afghanistan (GOA). 

6.  The delegation noted that the problem of insufficient personnel to hold cleared areas in Afghanistan could only be resolved through two means (or some combination thereof):  significantly more international forces, or a greater number of more effective Afghan forces.  Under current political circumstances, the provision of large numbers of additional NATO forces would appear unlikely, despite ISAF's persuasive rationale.

7.  Most interlocutors therefore suggested that the most important effort was in training and equipping Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).  This engendered a critical need for the deployment of additional Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) - teams of trainers who are embedded with Afghan units - in order to speed the development of the ANSF.

8.  Military and civilian officials agreed that the current state of the Afghan National Police (ANP), which could play a major role in 'backfilling' areas cleared of insurgents, was a major problem.  The ANP remained poorly equipped, poorly trained, and largely corrupt.  While national views differ on the issue, the Delegation was impressed with the initiative of the UK military at the Lashkar Gah PRT, which is providing military trainers for the local police forces to provide basic instruction in the most essential policing tasks.  However, this did not seem to be a widely shared approach, and the delegation left convinced that without a major additional attention to overhauling the ANP and the somewhat stronger Afghan National Army (ANA) through significant new training and equipping efforts, holding cleared territory will remain a major challenge. 

9.  Also of major tactical concern, beyond insufficient troops, was the paucity of theatre-appropriate helicopters, necessary for deployment of combat forces, for deployment of quick reaction teams and for medical evacuations.  The delegation saw first hand how valuable helicopters are in the rugged, vast, challenging territory of Afghanistan.  The delegation also learned that only a very limited portion of deployed helicopters are actually regularly available for operations - most are designated for resupply, personnel transport and other support needs.  NATO soldiers are paying the price for this deficiency in the extended times required to move forces around, and in delays in medical evacuation. 

10.  The delegation was also informed of the need for additional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, critical for knowledge of the battlespace.  Proper use of these assets help minimize civilian casualties, especially in the tactical environments of Afghanistan, which often include high compound walls or forested terrain with very low visibility from the ground, but much greater visibility from overhead.  Although French, German and Italian ISR assets had been performing well, they did not adequately address ISAF's needs - in part because of national caveats.1  NATO had therefore developed a reliance on ISR assets provided by US Central Command, a problem because these assets naturally respond in the first instance to US priorities, and thus often primarily for ongoing operations in Iraq.   The delegation was interested to learn that NATO was currently considering the common funding of a NATO Predator capability, as well as the analytical capability to support it. 

11.  The delegation was also told that while additional troops and assets would be welcomed in theatre, any new troop contributions needed to be 'balanced' - i.e. deployed along with the enabling capabilities such as helicopters, logistics, intelligence assets, spare parts and maintenance, etc, that would allow them to be effective in the demanding environment of Afghanistan.    

12.  National caveats overall had been significantly reduced since the Riga summit, and nations with forces in the south, where most of the heavy fighting was taking place, did not have significant restrictions.  However, General McNeill, COMISAF, stated that the 'in extremis' pledge of assistance announced at Riga 2 had not yet been tested; in such cases, he had thus far called in US forces instead.   McNeill called remaining caveats 'vexing,' stating that they still hampered his ability to concentrate military mass when needed, with sufficient speed to make a difference.  The delegation noted that Portuguese rapid-reaction forces had no caveats and were performing well.  

13.  In the non-operational sphere, governance problems continued to plague Afghanistan, a country that has been without effective central government for the past 30 years.  This is likely to remain a primary obstacle to the reconstruction of the country for the foreseeable future.  Corruption, often linked to the surging drug trade, crippled efforts at every level of government from, for example, the Ministry of the Interior, to provincial governors, to judges and police forces.  Without dramatic progress in these areas, the vision of a stable and democratic state, responsive to the needs of the Afghan people, will remain unattainable.

14.  The delegation concluded that perhaps the central strategic problem facing NATO in Afghanistan was the absence of a well-defined strategic vision for its presence there.  While NATO has successfully expanded its presence throughout the country, and while the personnel on the ground are performing brilliantly at the tactical level, the Alliance simply does not yet have a sufficiently explicit goal for what it wants to achieve in collaboration with the GOA.  Without such a vision, our forces in Afghanistan will continue to perform their current tasks with great success; they may not, however, succeed in creating the fundamental conditions of security and stability necessary for the emergence of an Afghan political solution.

15.  Fundamentally, the delegation came away with a sense that current efforts are making significant incremental progress, but not at a rate that will ensure without doubt an acceptable end state to our mission there.  NATO must undertake a fundamental examination and re-definition of its strategic vision for Afghanistan, and immediately provide those resources (both human and financial) necessary to accomplish that vision.

16.  Most observers agreed that the Afghan population remained, in large majority, 'on the fence,' unconvinced about joining the 15% on either political end of the spectrum strongly supporting either the insurgency or the central government.  Getting this large majority of mostly undecided Afghans to strongly support the central government and the new constitutional order will be critical. 

17.  Success in Afghanistan is possible, the delegation concluded; more progress is being made there every day, with tangible results for the Afghan people on a number of levels.  However, in order to ensure that NATO fully delivers on its commitment to Afghanistan in the most effective manner, the Alliance must ensure that it develops and implements a thorough, detailed, consensus strategic vision for its involvement in Afghanistan in order to map out and properly resource its efforts.

II. MEETINGS WITH MILITARY COMMANDERS AND NATO OFFICIALS

18.  The delegation met with ISAF Commander US General Dan McNeill, the ISAF Chief of Staff German Major General Bruno Kasdorf, the NATO Senior Civilian Representative Ambassador Daan Everts, and several NATO member state Ambassadors in Kabul.  The delegation visited ISAF Headquarters, which is also Regional Command (Center) in Kabul;  Regional Command (South) in Kandahar; and Regional Command (East) at Bagram Airbase, north of Kabul.  The group met senior commanders at each facility, including Brigadier General Joseph Votel, who is responsible for operations in NATO's Regional Command (East), as well as overall responsibility for all Operation Enduring Freedom.   Finally, the group was also briefed by a US Army officer from a US Embedded Training Team (ETT) working with the Afghan Border Police (ABP). 

19.  NATO's Senior Civilian Representative Ambassador Daan Everts argued that Afghans must step up their ownership of the reconstruction effort.  He believed Afghanistan had much more economic potential than was widely realized.  Within the ISAF mandate of security, governance, and reconstruction, it was governance that was the weakest leg of the chair.  On reconstruction, Afghanistan had received 1/20th of what had been provided to the Balkans on a per-capita basis.  One Allied Ambassador stated that the biggest danger was nations drawing down forces from Afghanistan in an unco-ordinated fashion.  Indeed, premature withdrawals would be a counterproductive signal to the Taliban, Everts argued. 

20.  Other international organizations had not demonstrated effectiveness in the Afghan context.  The UN was not stepping up to its role as overall co-ordinator of reconstruction efforts, and officials away from the capital suggested that the UN lacked a significant presence, especially in provinces like Helmand and Kandahar, where the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has declined to establish field offices until security is improved.  NATO had offered (without success) to provide security for potential UN offices in order to encourage further UN involvement.  NGOs, for their part, were often reluctant to work with NATO or other international military forces, for fear of losing the distinction between military and civilian efforts and potentially becoming considered as combatants. 

21.  The EU Police mission (EUPOL) repeatedly came under criticism.  While its concept had been appreciated, the small number of trainers deployed, and their strict Rules of Engagement (which some told the delegation amounted to national caveats) deprived EUPOL of the necessary flexibility to move around (especially out of Kabul) where they were needed.  In addition, the lack of agreement on ISAF's role in supporting the EUPOL mission, a result of well-known political difficulties in Brussels, also hampered its success.  The EU effort was notably dwarfed by the comparatively massive effort provided by the US in this area.

22.  The delegation noted a lack of consensus among national views on the role of the military in operations such as Afghanistan, and on how to deal with warlords, as well as on counter-narcotics efforts. Other unresolved issues included: how to engage Pakistan; how to define the 'enemy' in Afghanistan (while leaving room to potentially co-opt some current opponents into a political process); and how to find the proper balance between military and political efforts in the counter-insurgency.  These fundamental political differences made it extremely difficult to reach a consensus view on an overall strategy for NATO in Afghanistan.

23.  On the question of the counter-narcotics effort, the much-publicized proposals from the Canadian NGO the Senlis Council, which involved the introduction of controlled, legal poppy cultivation for medical purposed, were described as unrealistic for Afghanistan.  Poppy production was much too high, the price difference between legal and black market poppy was too different, and control of the geographic areas involved was still not feasible, it was argued.  In addition, the legalization of poppy cultivation flew in the face of both legal and religious prohibitions currently in place on its cultivation.  A more balanced approach of strengthening incentives to farmers to choose licit crops, and increasing the risk to farmers who grow poppies was proposed.  ISAF's role in support of the counter-narcotics effort also proved to be subject to varying interpretations.
 
24.  General Dan McNeill, ISAF Commander, suggested that ISAF should be considered an interim force, whose primary task was to stand up the ANSF.  An effective local security force was always required to defeat an insurgency, McNeill stated. The best way to ensure their rapid training was through the use of embedded trainers, called OMLTs by NATO and Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) by the US Embedded trainers not only helped stand up Afghan forces, but also gave them a sense of confidence in their own abilities, as well as serving as their link to both close air support and potential medical evacuation if needed.  NATO could make greater strides in this critical area by deploying a larger number of OMLTs.3  This would not only enhance and quicken the development of the ANA;  it could also potentially free up some of the US ETTs currently deployed with the ANA to shift their efforts to the training of the now higher-priority ANP.  

25.  Also among the principal concerns cited by Allied officials was the continued lack of needed personnel in theatre.  If the Alliance were to dedicate the same density of forces as it had in Kosovo, approximately 800,000 NATO troops would be deployed to Afghanistan.  Among the many damaging results of this lack of personnel was the fact that once an area had been cleared of insurgents, it could not be held because insurgents would return.  Absent a large increase in the number of international troops on the ground in Afghanistan, however, the safeguarding of cleared territory after a successful operation will have to be the responsibility of the ANSF, which once again leads to the call for more trainers.

26.  There was consensus that the ANP suffered from poor training and equipping, as well as other problems including low salaries, corruption and even drug addiction.  The EUPOL mission, while a positive development, has been hampered by the very small number of trainers, the fact that a majority of their number will be deployed in Kabul, inadequate equipment and funding and an unclear mandate. The absence of a clear political mandate to the military chain of command to support EUPOL teams is also hampering its start-up.

27.  Military officials suggested that additional quick reaction forces would allow NATO forces to decrease their reliance on Close Air Support (CAS), which some analysts argue increases the risk of civilian casualties. 

28.  The delegation observed a number of measures taken to reduce civilian casualties due to the use of air power in Afghanistan.  ISAF's Commander had issued guidance requiring consideration of whether a response was 'proportionate and discriminate', even if within the Rules of Engagement (RoE).   First, the delegation learned that all bombs used by the Alliance in CAS situations are precision-guided, mainly to reduce any potential harm to the soldiers calling in the strike.  The bombs are dropped with great accuracy, usually guided to a target by an operator on the ground who 'paints' it using a laser designator.  Secondly, the Alliance's access to state-of-the art Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) allowed air strikes to be based on extensive surveillance of a given target. 

29.  These measures, however, faced three major challenges:  first, Taliban fighters were forcing innocent civilians to remain, hidden, in a location they knew would be targeted.  Second, insurgents were conducting a disinformation campaign, for example claiming innocent victims when there were none, or disarming killed insurgents and claiming them as civilian casualties.  Third, NATO simply didn't have enough ISR assets to maximize their utility in theatre. 

30.  Helicopters were described as 'the coin of the realm' in the difficult terrain of Afghanistan, and the delegation learned that the insufficient number of helicopters at NATO's disposal there continued to plague the mission.  The delegation experienced first-hand the need for helicopters to reach distant population centers (and deployed NATO forces) isolated by rugged terrain and poor infrastructure.  The lack of helicopters endangers the lives of NATO soldiers by preventing the prompt deployment of quick reaction forces to assist in high-intensity engagements, as well as potentially delaying medical evacuation of wounded personnel.  The delegation was told that helicopters capable of operating in the Afghan environment did exist in five to seven NATO member state inventories, along with the capacity to provide them, but had not been deployed.  Particularly urgent was the need to find a replacement for the US helicopter airbridge for Kandahar, which had been scheduled to depart in December but had been extended by six months, twice, to January 2008.  4

31.  General McNeill also emphasized the importance of ongoing Pakistani efforts to deny sanctuaries to the Taliban fighters, in particular praising the effectiveness of the Tripartite Commission.   Finally, he stated that anyone arguing that NATO should not be undertaking 'nation-building' was in a state of denial about its current efforts in Afghanistan.

32.  Visiting Bagram Airbase, home of Regional Command (East) north of Kabul, the delegation met with Brigadier General Joseph Votel, the deputy commanding General for operations of the 82nd Airborne Division and Combined Joint Task Force 82 in Afghanistan, who is responsible for operations in NATO's Regional Command East, as well as overall responsibility for all Operation Enduring Freedom operations in Afghanistan.  Votel suggested much progress was being made, and that news coverage in western countries does not always reflect the reality on the ground.  Locals were increasingly tipping off Allied forces against Taliban activity, a very promising sign.  He re-emphasized the need for additional training teams, and the value of funding and delivering quick-impact development projects.    

33.  The delegation was given a soldier's-eye view of the complexities and challenges of working in Afghanistan from a US Army officer from a US Embedded Training Team (ETT) working with the Afghan Border Police (ABP).  Based at a small fire base on the Pakistani border, the officer's 18-member team was mentoring a 900-man ABP organization responsible for 550 km of Afghanistan's southern border.  The border checkpoints his team assessed had, for the most part, no electricity or running water, were poorly supplied, and had limited means to defend themselves.  Supplying even the US teams there was a challenge; two hours south of Kandahar by road, his team apparently spent their first six months without basic equipment including binoculars.  The officer shared his personal view that more troops in this effort would allow the international presence to extend outwards from firebases to make contact with the enemy; he added that logistics chains to support these efforts would be required. He urged reducing the size of static support bases in favour of expanding the number of NATO troops embedded with the ANSF.

III.MEETINGS WITH AFGHAN OFFICIALS AND OTHER CIVILIAN OFFICIALS

34.  The delegation met with the Afghan National Security Advisor, Dr. Zalmay Rassoul, who expressed his gratitude for international efforts in Afghanistan and suggested the delegations tell their constituents about the great work being accomplished thanks to their sacrifices; however, he insisted that international forces should stay until the job was finished.  Afghanistan would repay their sacrifices in its humble way, as a stable and secure promoter of shared values in a difficult region.  He suggested the GOA had understood the reasons for the 2006 resurgence of the Taliban, which included inadequate governance provided in the south, a lack of progress on development and economic benefits for the average Afghan, and the availability of a safe haven in Pakistan for 5,000-10,000 hard-core Taliban fighters after their defeat in 2001.  The Taliban had been waiting for another collapse to return, but seeing the development of a democratic process, decided to return and try to derail the progress being made.  Dr. Rassoul also suggested that the Taliban sought to exploit the changeover to NATO command from Coalition forces.

A.PARLIAMENTARY DIALOGUE

35.  Among the highlights of the trip was the opportunity to continue the parliamentary dialogue between the NATO PA and the Afghan Parliament, which has included visits by a delegation of Afghans to several NATO PA meetings.  In Kabul, the DSC delegation met with the Speaker of the Wolesi Jirga (the Lower House) Mohammed Younis Qanuni, Sayed Hamed Gaylani, Deputy Speaker of the Meshrano Jirga (the Upper House), as well as the Chairmen and members of the Committee on Defence and Territorial Affairs and the Committee on Internal Affairs. 

36.  Mr. Qanuni expressed gratitude for the efforts of NATO in Afghanistan, and congratulated ISAF for having conducted very successful operations; the international presence was good for Afghanistan.  He suggested that Parliamentary work is a new experience for Afghans, and its full success would come with time; however, the fact that former enemies were now settling disputes with voting cards rather than guns was a positive development.  Despite the important achievements to date, Qanuni regretted that the Afghan government had not made as much progress as it should have, especially in the areas of governance, counter-narcotics, and counterterrorism.  He also suggested that local people were not yet seeing sufficient positive economic changes.  Qanuni was concerned about the treatment of Afghan civilians by NATO forces; however, he emphatically stated that Afghanistan still needed the international community's help and support. The Afghan government must take advantage of the opportunity of the presence of international forces to take major steps forward, Qanuni stated.

37.  Deputy Speaker Gaylani stated that the Afghan Parliament had made major efforts to ensure that the international presence in Afghanistan was invited under Afghan law, to counter any charges of undesired invasion or occupation.  The majority of Afghans and the Parliamentarians representing them were extremely conservative and had very little contact with the outside world, Gaylani stated, and he therefore requested that the delegation's members ensure that there are regular visits of Afghan parliamentarians to their countries.  He also emphasized that a political solution to instability in Afghanistan would inescapably have to include some of those currently fighting against the central government; giving insurgents the opportunity to take part in the political process was the only way to co-opt them.

38.  The Chairman of the Defence Committee, Mr. Noorul Haq Ulumi, stated that major benchmarks in training of the ANSF would be reached on schedule.  He argued that the ANA should be provided with its own air assets in order to control its own airspace and provide air support to its troops; that way, should civilian casualties arise, they would not be the fault of NATO.  He also suggested that the equipment being donated to the ANSF was of poor quality.  Finally, Ulumi stated that oversight of defense spending in Afghanistan was currently nearly impossible, blaming poor transparency, accountability and co-operation from the Ministries of Defence and Interior. A committee of the US Congress had agreed to assist by providing Ulumi with all the information it had on defence expenditures in Afghanistan, he added. 

39.  Finally, a meeting with over a dozen members of two security committees of the Afghan parliament demonstrated the wide range of views on the international presence among elected Afghan representatives.  While some representatives expressed gratitude for the progress made in the country thanks to the international presence, others strongly questioned both its tactics and objectives.  Nearly all expressed concern regarding civilian casualties caused by NATO operations.  The Afghan delegation to the NATO PA, in a separate meeting with the delegation, confirmed that there was a wide range of views in Parliament.  The NATO PA Secretary General suggested that the Assembly might provide useful training opportunities for Afghan parliamentarians to help them perform their oversight functions, especially by sharing the experience of NATO PA members in this area.

40.  The delegation also visited the Turquoise Mountain Foundation, led by former British diplomat Rory Stewart.  This remarkable NGO had established crafts-training programmes in traditional Afghan skills, and was restoring large sections of the old city of Kabul.  Stewart, who had also worked in the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, suggested that the basic conservatism of local Afghans must be understood before outsiders could make an impact.  He expressed his view that neither a major increase of troops, nor a precipitous withdrawal, were useful options; rather, he advocated a 'realistic' strategy of containment of the terrorist (Al Qaeda) and conventional (Taliban) threat, along with continued development assistance on a humanitarian basis; this would lead to what he called a 'modest victory' that the west should be able to live with. 

IV.VISITS TO PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

41.  The delegation visited three PRTs during its time in Afghanistan: in Panjsher Province in the North, as well as in Kandahar Province and Lashkar Gah in Helmand Province in the South, the latter usually considered among the hotspots for poppy cultivation and insurgent activity in Afghanistan today. 

42.  PRTs, which are led by individual countries or groups of countries, do not yet have a standard approach to their activities.  The delegation was told that co-ordinating best practices among different PRTs, in order to maximize their effectiveness, faced political obstacles in Brussels.  An illustrative example the delegation learned about was the occasion on which one NATO country blocked the publication of the minutes of a recent PRT conference on best practices, because of concern that the type of development and reconstruction work represented by PRTs is 'not what NATO should be doing.'

A.PANJSHER VALLEY:  A "SUCCESS STORY"

43.  The civilian-led PRT located in Panjsher Valley north of Kabul, while still facing significant challenges, was presented as a 'success story' of PRT work. 5   Panjsher Valley, largely isolated by rugged terrain, is one of the 13 'poppy-free' provinces.  The delegation saw agriculture such as grapes and orchards, and visited development projects such as a micro-hydro power generation plant and a 48 km road funded by the PRT ($20.3 million of USAID (United States Agency for International Development) funds), observing that commerce (such as gas stations and small private shops) had sprung up along the roadside. 

44.  The success of the Panjsher PRT was attributed to several factors, including the fairly homogeneous Tajik provincial population.  In addition, the PRT commander in Panjsher praised the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding mechanism, stating that it was a very effective tool to cut through red tape and quickly fund critical, high-impact projects. 6

45.  The delegation met with Panjsher provincial Governor Asadullah Wafa, who expressed his pride in his province's progress, his gratitude for the PRT's efforts and partnership, and his determination to carry out the Provincial Development Plan he has laid out.  Panjsher province's principal difficulties, Wafa stated, included insufficient incomes and limited private sector activity.  Governor Wafa also shared his views on the national situation, recommending that terrorists in Afghanistan be confronted before their position is further strengthened.  He also suggested that anything but steadfastness in the face of the problem of narcotics will strengthen the insurgency further. 

B.LASHKAR GAH AND KANDAHAR: A CHALLENGING ENVIRONMENT

46.  The delegation visited Kandahar Airbase and the PRT at Lashkar Gah in Helmand Province, the source of a majority of Afghanistan's poppy cultivation.  The British-led Lashkar Gah PRT was enacting a "Comprehensive Approach," which went somewhat beyond the mandate provided to ISAF by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), which mentions security, reconstruction and development and governance, but only gives primary responsibility to ISAF forces for security.  The delegation learned that the comprehensive approach, which involved the use of all aspects and capabilities of Allied governments (military, aid, technical assistance, intelligence sharing, diplomatic pressure, etc.) to achieve the task at hand, had been blocked at the NAC by a lack of consensus, with some nations contending that the reconstruction activities that such an approach implied should not be part of NATO's competencies.  The delegation observed first hand, however, the critical need for ISAF forces to contribute to reconstruction efforts and to strengthen governance in Afghanistan and learned that many other nations besides the UK had recognized this need and made important efforts in this area.

47.  The PRT's counter-narcotics strategy was described as based on four principles:  targeting traffickers, promoting rural development (and thus alternative economic activities), reducing demand (for instance through the construction of addiction treatment centres), and building the state's counter-narcotic institutions.  While NATO's mandate does not permit ISAF to participate directly in poppy eradication, ISAF is permitted to destroy stockpiles or precursor chemicals it comes across during normal operations. 

48.  NATO's mandate in counter-narcotics remains subject to different interpretations by different member states, the delegation learned.  Some nations have advocated the use of ground-based spraying of herbicides against the poppy fields, claiming that it would be less costly and more effective than current approaches based on manual and mechanized destruction of poppy crops.  This approach has been categorically refused by the GOA, due to concerns regarding potential health problems caused by the chemicals, as well as a legacy of Soviet chemical weapons use against Afghanistan.  An additional concern is the possible propaganda victory for the Taliban that spraying would represent.

49.  The delegation was told that some NATO countries consider the counter-narcotic effort a 'second war' (in addition to that against insurgents), requiring its own investment of resources, and are thus reluctant to support it.  Pressure was likely to increase within NATO to review its Operations Plan (OPLAN) in order to potentially include a greater role in support of counter-narcotic operations. 

50.  The leadership of the Lashkar Gah PRT also explained the value of training ANP forces.  Several very successful military operations had been undertaken in their area of responsibility this year, with Allied forces clearing important territory of insurgents.  However, the limited number of personnel available, and the dearth of effective ANP personnel to move in and consolidate the gains made by NATO forces meant that insurgents were able to return to previously cleared areas.  For this reason, and because of the lack of a co-ordinated NATO police training effort (due to a lack of consensus among NATO member states on the issue), the UK had decided to get on with it and begin providing military trainers for the local police forces to provide basic instruction in the most essential policing tasks. 

51.  Problems with the ANP, however, were only part of the several inter-related difficulties facing the Afghan justice sector, the delegation learned.  Police forces are by definition reliant on a legal justice system as well as a proper penitentiary system to successfully carry out their work.  Neither is currently available in Afghanistan.  The delegation learned that only 5 to 10 % of cases are handled by the formal judicial system.  The weak link in this area continues to be a lack of qualified civil servants such as prosecutors and judges; many of those who had such skills left Afghanistan and have not returned.  The delegation was dismayed to hear that recent surveys showed that 90% of the Afghan public believed obtaining governmental services would require a bribe 50% of the time. 

V.VISIT TO TAJIKISTAN: DEVELOPING CLOSER TIES WITH A PFP MEMBER

52.  The Delegation met with Tajik and Allied officials in Dushanbe, Tajikistan September 7-8.  At a meeting hosted by the French Embassy in its capacity as the NATO Contact Point, the delegation learned that Tajikistan, among the poorest countries in the region, was at a crossroads.  The country remained dependent on international economic assistance, and as a result, Tajikistan was potentially vulnerable to a number of different external influences.  The country was still recovering from the civil war of 1992-1997, and a lack of industrial activity, a shortage of labor, as well as other factors continued to hold the country back.  In addition, the international community viewed the increasingly authoritarian leadership of the country with concern.  However, Allied and Tajik officials agreed that these significant challenges only justified greater international engagement with Tajikistan. 

53.  The Delegation met with the First Deputy Minister of Defence and Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant-General Ramil Nadirov, and members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  The delegation sought further information on Tajikistan's relationship with Afghanistan, its views on regional security, and its relationship to NATO. 

54.  Tajikistan was very concerned about the situation in its southern neighbour, Afghanistan, with which it shared a 1,206 km border, Tajik officials told the delegation.  The smuggling of narcotics, small arms, and other contraband across the border constituted a major threat.  Tajik officials suggested that Afghan border guards they interacted with were unable and often unwilling to address narcotics smuggling from their side. 

56.  However, Afghanistan also represented a potential commercial partner for Tajikistan:  it was described as a potential corridor for the transport of energy resources to Asia and Europe.  Bridges currently under construction, including a new bridge completed by USAID and opened the week before, could allow for the development of trade links; Tajikistan was ready to export electricity, building materials and other goods to Afghanistan.  Such bridges would provide access to Pakistani ports and therefore inexpensive shipping options.  Lieutenant-General Nadirov told the delegation that Tajikistan had offered to send military forces to Afghanistan to assist the international effort, but that Afghanistan had refused troops from any neighbouring country. 

57.  NATO and Tajikistan, which has been a member of the Partnership for Peace since 2002, have been exploring the possibilities for further developing their cooperation.  Aside from joint work on border issues, Tajikistan takes part in a small number of PfP activities with NATO.  Tajiks were taking part in NATO language courses, as well as de-mining training. 7  NATO had recently reached out to Tajikistan through a visit of its Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia, Amb. Robert Simmons, Jr, in May 2007 to discuss ongoing cooperation and regional security; a visit of the Tajik Defence Minister to NATO followed.  However, Tajik and NATO officials agreed that current collaboration remains rather limited.  A planned visit by a Tajik delegation to NATO Headquarters in late September will provide a further opportunity to explore the parameters of the relationship.   

58.  The delegation also toured the French military presence at Dushanbe, a major hub for Allied transport into and out of Afghanistan, as well as the current location of French Mirage fighter planes operating in support of international efforts in Afghanistan.8  The impressive facilities were making an important contribution to Allied operations, the delegation learned. 

1   The delegation learned, for instance, that German Tornado reconnaissance planes would not provide intelligence in real time, in order to abide by a national caveat preventing their direct support of combat operations.
2   The 'in extremis' pledge refers to an agreement announced at the Riga Summit of November 2006, whereby nations with national caveats agreed to allow their forces to come to the aid of NATO forces in an emergency.  This agreement was not spelled out in public documents. 
3   The delegation learned that ISAF sought perhaps more than 45 OMLTs, but that only 22 had been made available, with only 18 fully operational and functioning.
4   General McNeill, COMISAF, suggested that a possible role for common-funded contracted airlift, similar to what the US was using in the east of Afghanistan, might alleviate this situation by allowing military aircraft to focus on moving personnel while contracted aircraft could move supplies.  However, such a possibility had yet to be agreed in Brussels.
5   The US-led PRT is headed by a US State Department civilian, by agreement with local authorities, and in order to avoid heightened local sensibilities to any appearance of military occupation or invasion. 
6    Leaders of the British-led PRT in Lashkar Gah were less enthusiastic about CERP funding, describing it as potentially leading to unwise, unsustainable projects. 
7   The civil war of 1992-1997 reportedly left a dangerous legacy of unexploded ordnance (UXO); NATO's training programme is intended to address this problem through direct action as well as the training of local experts.
8   At the time of writing, France had announced its intent to move Mirage fighters to Kandahar Airbase, but this move had not yet occurred.